Democratic barricades: the presence of radio in the resistance to the 1964 military coup

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Abstract:

This text articulates two great discussions within the history of this country: the discussions about the circumstances prior to the military coup and the role of the radio media in the political context of the conflict. Individually, each of these aspects will allow us a reflection over different points of view here articulated in a sociocultural approach; We have, thus, organized this discussion based on two main themes: we will start with the “Campanha da Legalidade” (Campaign for Legality), occasion which congregates both themes, and then we will discuss both the historical context of the 1964 military coup and the role of the radio media and its strong social and political presence.

Keywords: Brazil radio; Brazilian culture; radio and culture; history of media

The Radio in Brazil – A brief history

The radio in Brazil was born under the frameworks of politics and our intention is to reflect on the connection between this media and the national political context. This article therefore intends to reflect on the role, or use, of the radio media by the Brazilian politicians, with a special analysis of the context prior to the military coup. In 1922, in Rio de Janeiro, the first official radio transmission presents the speech of Epitácio Pessoa, Brazil’s President at the time. It would still take a few years for the radio to become a media of strong social and political articulation, in spite of being used by Julio Prestes when he was running for President. The slowness of the radio diffusion is due to a course of popular dissemination of this media which needed, first of all, to make radio equipment cheaper and to implement a type of programming aimed to the masses. In 1931, with the decree n. 20.047, radio broadcasting becomes, legally, an activity of national interest and the first great impulse towards its dissemination happens with Getúlio Vargas, in 1932, who creates a legal order for the use of publicity within this media, thus changing its economic structure, which allowed for the medium to be redefined in terms of its search for a broader audience and popular programming. Many studies point at its role during Getúlio’s government, highlighting, on one hand, the role of radio in the 1932 Revolution and, on the other hand, the political use of this media by the Vargas’s government itself in order to strengthen his governance. It will happen in 1938, when the program ‘Hora do Brasil’ (Brazil’s Hour) was created, with Luiz Jatobá as the broadcaster who, in 1939, with the decree 1949/39, makes the transmission of this program mandatory in all radio stations; later, the Rádio Nacional becomes the federal government’s speaker.

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The 1940’s will be known as “the golden years of radio”, for the reasons already expressed: strengthening of the publicity, programming aimed to the masses, and tax incentives. In 1941 the radio journalism becomes stronger with the program “Reporte Esso”, on Rádio Nacional, broadcasted for 27 years. In 1942, during the dictatorial period of the Vargas’ government, Alexandre Marcondes, then Labor Minister was given a weekly program of 10 minutes in ‘Hora do Brasil’. Gomes (Gomes, 2005) shows us the important role fulfilled by this program by structuring a continuous dialog between the government and the masses, creating visibility for the Vargas’ government, since its main theme was the debate about the labor legislation build by the dictator and aimed, mainly, at the illiterate population. The program, whose title was ‘Falando aos Trabalhadores Brasileiros’ (Speaking to the Brazilian Workers) intended to clarify the legislation, a purpose which was considered successful considering the number of messages the program would receive from different social spheres, besides the time it remained in production, it was only terminated in July 1945. From this experience, an aspect of interest, as pointed by Alexandre Marcondes himself, in a moment when he self- evaluated his insertion, after fifty lectures given:

“... the weekly program expressed an experience intended to disseminate in a fast and broad way the government measures in terms of social legislation. Because of the long distances within the national territory and the difficulties in communication, radio was the medium considered most convenient for this project of providing clarification for the workers in the country from north to south.” (Gomes, 2005, 212, translated from the Portuguese).

The ‘mobility-speed’ composition expressed above shows itself as the main theme in the radio media. Most of the political radio programs interacted, at the same time, with the newspaper through the publication of the speeches in articles of different newspapers, integrating, this way, the two main mass media mediums in that context; but it’s clear how the radio media had a specific ability for mobilization, which was essential in all moments analyzed. When analyzing the context of 1945 in the so called Movimento Queremista², Jorge Ferreira highlights the importance of radio’s specificity. In this matter, the author refers to the masses’ struggles for Getúlio Vargas to remain in power, against the movement orchestrated by UDN, through its presidential candidate, Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes, who, on a certain stage of his electoral campaign, gave a speech about the great mass of the population, which was in favor of his competitor, as a ‘malta de desocupados’ (a malta of unoccupied people). This phrase intensifies the conflict:

“Malta for the Brigadier, would be the set of workers who took part in the queremista rallies, because, in his political perception, they had received money from the Ministry of Labor in order to participate in the demonstrations for Vargas to be kept in power. Borghi referred to the dictionary and read: [Malta – a grouping of wolves, a conglomerate of people of bad resemblance, workers who go through the railways taking their brown bags, brown bag eaters] Brown bag eaters [those who eat their lunches from a brown bag], he thought, was better than malta. With political sensitiveness, it wasn’t hard to realize that the term brown bag eater was catchier than malta. On the following day, Borghi mobilized a chain of 150 radio stations. Going straight to the point, he declared: ‘The greatest proof that Mister Brigadier is the candidate of the posh people, of the millionaires, of the rich, of the barons, of the people’s exploiters is that he declared he doesn’t need the vote of the brown bag eaters, those who work, who fight.” (Ferreira, 2005, p. 81 - underlined by the author - translated from the Portuguese).

In this example, the specificity of the radio media is put; its accessibility (for those who want to make use of it and to reach their target public), its mobility and speed. It would have been unfeasible to articulate, in record time (in this case, the following day) the media diffusion via written press, and it also would not have reached most of the territory, or its target audience, the masses. Still, we must not understand the strong dissemination of radio broadcasting based only on its technical characteristics. In both quoted cases, there’s a strong proximity between the radio content and the expectations of the masses in terms of the symbolic acceptance of the worker:

² Movimento Queremista was a movement aimed to keep Getúlio Vargas in power. The word “queremista” comes from the verb “querer” (to want) present in the slogan “Queremos Getúlio” (We want Getúlio) used by the movement.
in the first case, the lectures given by Alexandre Marcondes, the purpose is to value the workers by highlighting their rights and, in the second case, in a similar way, the indignation in the face of the kind of treatment given to the worker who needs a brown bag to eat his lunch from. Therefore, we understand that the radio programs focused on national politics seek the continuous and growing recognition of its audience, forming a continuous negotiation of meaning in the construction of a symbolic reference about the workers. The worker could identify a medium which confirmed a desired social condition, making radio an important cultural mediator. All of these characteristics will define the continuous use of politics within radio in the context intended in this article. Such characteristics will also be the mark of the object of analysis here proposed: “the Campaign for Legality”. In this short course of the radio history then, we will highlight the context of 1961-63, and this period will be the basis for our comments.

**Precedents: The Characters**

In August 27, 1961, Mr. Jânio Quadros, then President, renounced power creating one of the biggest political standstills ever lived in this country. That happened because vice-president elect, Mr. João Goulart, represented, for many sectors, the ascension of both the left-wing sectors and the return of a populist logic of governance, as a legitimate successor of Getúlio Vargas. On that, we can make a few brief comments: Like Getúlio, Gourlart started his political career in Rio Grande do Sul, coached by Vargas. They came from families which had a long history of friendship and Goulart was very important in Vargas’ personal life while helping in the administration of his farms. It’s interesting to notice that part of the Brazilian historiography condemns Goulart as a politic leader, accusing him of being indecisive, soft, etc, but there’s no doubt about his role as administrator of his assets, having become, on his own merit, one of the greatest farmers in the country. This way, Vargas introduced him to the political life, locally at first, starting as the regional president of the PTB party, becoming a state representative in 1947 and national president of PTB in 1952. His political career grows even greater in 1953, when he becomes the Labor Minister in Vargas´ last mandate. It is worth going deeper into this period because here his political conduct and populist fame are defined. Jango, as he became known, had an important role during his time at the Ministry of Labor.

Among the actions taken while in this position, we highlight, based on the debate proposed by Gomes (Gomes, 2007), the abolishing of the so called ‘Atestado ideológico’ (ideological certificate). This document was issued by the Departamento Estadual da Ordem Política e Social – DEOPS (State Department of Political and Social Order) and certified that the worker who had a position in the union was not a communist; this way, Jango brands to veto to ideological persecution. Along with this decision, he decides on the ‘abolishment of the intervention in the union’ when a board considered to be left-wing were in charge. Like that, any tendency would have its turn ensured. Such procedures launched a new phase for Gourlart’s Ministry of Labor (since taking the job in 1953) crowned by ‘agreements between parts’, where all issues are always negotiated. It allowed an approximation between the union leaders (PT members or communists) and the Ministry of Labor. Such approximation was intensified by the request for union leadership to help supervise the labor legislation. This is considered by the businessmen, conservative politicians and most of the press as an invasive act, referred to, in a negative way, of subversive and communist actions. Another hot issue among businessmen and conservative politicians is the proposal to summon the ‘Congresso da Previdência Social’ (Congress of Social Security Pension) in August 1953. It proposed that unions should participate in the administration of the autarchies of the Social Security Pension in a triple-sided structure formed by the Estate, businessmen and workers, who would, together, administrate the social security resources. Besides the highlighted aspects, Jango launched a phase where the formality and distance between the Ministry of Labor and the workers were discarded, opening the doors of the Ministry to any worker who wanted an audience with the Minister, any time of the day. We notice, then, that Jango’s actions were close to the symbolic reference being built regarding the worker’s role. The last act of large
impact during his time at the Ministry of Labor was the proposed raise of the minimum wages, in fact, the propose
to double it with 100% raise. The reaction was so intense that Goulart leaves his position, but the raise is
announced on May 1, 1954. In this period, Jango defines his personal and political personality, launching a phase
of continuous dialog; many are the statements showing that Jango did not establish distinctions among his
audience, taking in, indistinctively, politicians, union members and workers, any time of the day and with no pre-
scheduling. For that, he’s labeled populist, which became an important fact prior to the coup. Before going back
to the main theme of this article, a reminder that Jango still is, in the period between 1956 and 1963, twice the
most voted Vice-President in the whole of Brazil’s political history, considering that, in this period, elections for
president and vice-president were distinct.

In 1961, Jango is elected Vice-President of Jânio Quadros with more votes than the President himself and
still representing PTB, which as not the same party as Jânio’s. Jango was in an official trip to China when Jânio
Quadros renounced, what made an internal articulation possible in order to prevent Jango’s return to the country.
On this subject, we shall also consider a few points. Going back to the historical context previously exposed, but
now centered in the lines of construction of the Military corporation itself; this is necessary in order to
demonstrate how the insertion of the military in politics had been built gradually, with different contexts of
military coups which helps us show that the 1961 coup attempt is a project in construction and not a specific
reaction to the context opened after Jânio’s renunciation. Martins Filho (Martins Filho, 2008) defends that the
unsuccessful coups performed by the Military Corporation, since 1945, were not due to the fragility or the lack of
a project, as the civilian sector imagined; it is due indeed to an internal polarity which generates groups in conflict
towards its actions. A brief retrospective follows:

The Armed Forces have a direct influence in the decision making processes from 1945, point from which
we will retrieve some aspects, on the view of Martins Filho. In 1947, with the instauration of the Cold War, an
internal debate takes place and the military pursues an institutional, and not individual, course of action. As a
consequence, in 1949, the ESG - Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior School of War) is founded, a project started
in 1942 under the command of General Oswaldo Cordeiro de Faria, subordinated to the Estado Maior das Forças
Armadas (Mayor Estate of the Armed Forces). The ESG shows approximation to the United States of America -
USA, incorporating its theoretical references, being the most important the concept of national security, which
generates a reordering in terms of the understanding of the idea of national defense. This amplification
incorporates the mobilization of the whole society, that is, defense is not limited to its borders, against a foreign
enemy, but the possibility of enemy presence internally. This way, the concerns are turned to the interior enemy, a
concept which didn’t exist up to that moment. Besides ESG, the Military Corporation organizes itself through the
Clube Militar (Military Club), a non-party institution which carries most of the Military Corporation’s attitude. This
club, however, indicates the presence of different streams within the Corporation, possible to classify in:
nationalist, antinationalist, communist, legalist. From those, we highlight the figure of General Lott, who will
represent the legalist sectors and will have an important role both in the Juscelino’s election of 1956, and the
maintenance of Jango in 1961. It will also be important in order not to avoid a complete radicalization within the
context of 1955.

We will now provide a brief description of the 1955 Crisis intending to show that Lott’s role in the
“Campaign for Legality” in 1961 is in accordance with the political posture adopted during the course of his whole
career and not on the specific context of Jânio’s renunciation. The crisis of 1955 starts with Vargas’ suicide; in such
circumstances, Café Filho takes up this position for one year, until the elections of 1955. This government,
however, is formed by a majority of udenistas³. The only name in the Ministry which does not fit in is General
Teixeira Lott, Minister of War. Despite the opposition of the udenistas, the parliamentary elections remain for

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³ Udenista is a member of the UDN – União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union), a conservative party which constituted the opposition to the government of Getúlio Vargas.
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03/10/54. PSD is the only party with major number of congressmen (112 to 114) and UDN loses chairs: 84-74. PTB is raised in 5 chairs but it's not the biggest bench. PDS then launches Juscelino Kubitschek as a presidential candidate, and João Goulart as vice. The communist party announces they will support Juscelino. The crisis is up! UDN launches Juarez Távora and the party's discourse remains the same: against fraud, demagogy and 'dirty practices'. Their main supporter is Carlos Lacerda, who represents it all well in fact.

The Military Club, now presided by Canrobert Pereira da Costa, is pro-UDN. A reminder that, in this period, the Military Club has a majority of udenistas after winning the Chapa Azul in the biannual 1954-56, with 7.145 votes against 2.050 of the Chapa Amarela. His discourse is against 'fooling the population'. It's essential to highlight that, the support profile of this coup, is different from the previous one. Right now, only the far-right wing pushes the coup. Broad sectors of society (businessmen, students, sectors of the press) are against it. The legality support prevails. But the sectors of the far-right keep on moving. Lacerda creates the first case of the 'Carta de Brandi' (Brandi's letter), later proved to be a fraud. In spite of it all, Juscelino wins the elections and the confrontation begins with the attempt to stop him from inaugurating. The greatest win for those opposed to the coup is the verification of the explicity of the internal disputes within the Armed Forces. Two groups are formed: one in favor of the coup and another one against, in the name of legality. During the dispute, due to the ascension of Carlos Luz as President (who supports Lacerda) the coup supporters are the majority and have a real chance to win. General Teixeira Lott, War Minister, puts his neck on the line when opposes the coup (and gives a speech before General Jurandir mamede during Vaz's funeral, what breaks the whole hierarchy of the Armed Forces) and virtually loses his position because of his destitution by Carlos Luz. The situation only changes when he, strengthened by the support of the highest ranks of the Army, keeps the discourse of legality and organizes a counter-coup called "Novembrada". Carlos Luz is then dismissed and replaced by Nereu Ramos. A war-state is created, basically a war between sectors of the Armed Forces. The coup supporters are reduced after not getting the support of São Paulo and they have to surrender. The legalists win, a fact that leads us to reinforce some important aspects: first, the presence of a sector within the armed forces with a legalist profile since de 1950's, what takes us to another point, no matter how much the armed forces tried, there was not internal agreement, and this fact will also help us understand the context of 1961. Finally, we highlight the person of Lott, who will keep the same posture during his whole political career and will represent a key piece in the context of 1961.

The context of 1961-63: an ambient of positioning and radicalization

Jânio Quadro's government starts by showing that it will not follow an orthodox model. On that basis, breaks with the automatic alignment with the USA and aims to get closer to Africa, Asia and non-aligned countries such as Egypt and Yugoslavia, causing friction in external politics. Another sensitive issue is the Brazilian position confirming the independence of Cuba against the north-American guidance, in early 1961 and the decoration of Che Guevara in Brazilian soil, by Jânio, with the Ordem Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul. Internally, Jânio lives his first year of government with syndications opened and requested by Jânio himself in order to verify corruption accusations in a clear attempt to politically reach both the Vice-President and his political rivals. In the economic area, there is a great raise in the international debt, public deficit and inflation, worsen by Jânio for sending to the National Congress a Bill intended to control the profit remittance of the foreign companies. Considering this, his renunciation is welcomed, a fact not expected by the President himself, as he thought he would get the support from both Congress and Armed Forces. A new moment of tension then begins: the attempt to halt the ascension of the Vice-President.

4 The Ordem Nacional do Cruzeiro do Sul is the highest decoration given to a foreign individual by the Brazilian government and is considered an act of international relations.
When a new coup attempt is announced, articulated by sectors of the Armed Forces and politicians of UDN, with the intent to stop the Vice-President from inaugurating since it was João Goulart, pro-legality mobilizations started. We consider this moment to be essential in the analysis of the articulations between the revolutionary and political context and the role of radio as a media filled with specificity:

In the afternoon of August 27, 1961, in Porto Alegre, the employee of Correios e Telégrafos (the mail service) Carlos Guaragna calibrated a ham radio receptor, another one among so many others. João realized that, strangely, in one of the radio lines, someone was transmitting messages in Morse code – something unusual for such equipment. The experience of the professionals made it not hard to realize the anxiety of the operator, reflected on the more and more nervous beats. When João realized that such transmission originated from the HQ of III Army, based in Porto Alegre, he immediately took a pencil and intercepted the message from general Antônio Carlos Murici, from the state’s capital, alerted general Orlando Geisel, in Brasilia: “I communicate that the III Army has intercepted a message from the Governor, addressed to Dr. Jango, offering troops from Rio Grande to be sent by plane to Brasilia, in order to secure his ascension. The governor is arming the population and causing agitations in the countryside. (…) Due to the strong tension it is possible that the smallest incident triggers a civil war, with serious consequences. (…) Repression-operations are ready to be put in place when the moment is appropriate” 1. Casually then, João realized the III Army was monitoring all communications of the Palácio Piratini, headquarters of the state government. Concerned and afraid, João intercepted yet many other messages exchanged between the high rank of the Army. In the evening, one of them in particular made him anxious. From Guanabara, generals had instructed the commander of the III Army, general Machado Lopes: “(...) fortitude and energy is needed from the III Army to stop the strength of the potential rival from growing, as it has all interest in keeping the order so Mr. João Goulart may take up the presidency”. (Ferreira, 1997, translated from the Portuguese).

The above transcripts recount the tension started on August 27 after Jânio Quadros’s renunciation in August 25. João Carlos Guaragna’s report, restored by Ferreira, recovers the atmosphere created in such context; the implied risks of such operation; the profound unpredictability of that moment; the definition of the groups that start moving and, finally, the role of radio in that situation. The first mark of the specificity of radio, implied in the transcripts, is another form of accessibility. In this case, the ability to interact, intercept, possible through the radio waves and not possible on the newspaper or even on television, present in this context, but still with little influence. This small fact may have definitively changed the course of action, as the resistance to the coup was able to mobilize groups and articulate strategies.

Let’s start by highlighting the role of Leonel Brizola. Politician for a long time, also brought into politics by Getúlio Vargas, governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul through the PTB party, brother-in-law of João Goulart. He becomes the main character in the context of 1961 by being the responsible for creating and articulating the “Rede da Legalidade” (The Network of Legality) in order to ensure Jango’s ascension. In the circumstances of the above quote, Brizola was already gathering his supporters from the III Army in order to receive Jango in the country and, as we could see, his articulation is intercepted by Jango’s opposers, who also begin to gather forces against Jango by putting another coup in action. The image reconstructed by historiography and by the memory of those who participated directly in the scenario of the Network of Legality, is of a movement, started by Brizola, carrying a gun with one hand and a microphone with the other. This image is elucidative so, once again, we can think the radio and its political role.

The use of radio is essential for mobilizing the population, which responds promptly to the appeals of the governor and gathers in great numbers at the main square, in front of Palácio Piratini, articulating against the coup. The weight of this media is so great in that moment, and the above quote shows the reaction put in place: to shut the opposition up. As per statement of Lauro Hagemann5, Esso reporter for a long time, a recognized

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5 We have used a audio statement given by Hagemann, available at the website of 50 years of Campaign for Legality (Campanha da Legalidade 50 anos)
radio voice, the Radio Department of the Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas, mobilized their fiscal agents and ordered them to confiscate the crystals of the radio stations of Rio Grande do Sul in order to halt the mobilization. They confiscate the crystals of the radio stations Farroupilha, Gaucho and Difusora, and forget Guaíba. Homero Simon then suggests to Brizola that he uses Guaíba’s transmitters to continue his transmissions. The idea is taken promptly and the radio station is installed in the cellars of Palácio Piratininga and the transmitter is guarded by the Brigade troops, what makes an action from the coup supports impossible. The “Network of Legality” then starts, with the support of another 15 short and mediumwave radio stations around the country, and also the translation and transmission, via shortwave, to other countries. As per statement of Holmes Aquino, it shows the need for a deep articulation between different radio station in the use of waves in the country and around the world. In Brazil, helped by the radios of Rio Grande do Sul, they use shortwaves, reaching countries of German, English and Spanish languages in a clearly international network. Because of all of it, Brizola needs to keep continuous transmissions, made through recordings transmitted by Rádio Guaíba in the articulation above described.

The different reports show the hardships faced in order to ensure the transmissions. Erika Kramer, a 23-year-old journalist student at the time, tells that she spent days at the editorial office living on coffee and sandwiches, in charge of writing the text and broadcasting it in German, since she was fluent in the language. Hagemann, the Esso Reporter of Rio Grande do Sul, in an audio-statement, tells that, by listening to the Network of Legality transmissions, realizes that the official Rádio Guaíba broadcaster cannot be on air 24 hours a day, what causes a serious of bad insertions, with unqualified people creating badly written content and the contact with voices incompatible to the needs of radio. For that reason, he realizes he needs to participate and offers himself as a broadcaster. After that, he says, most of the radio broadcasters offer themselves to help, creating a unprecedented fact for radio history: it is the first time the radio broadcasters saw themselves as a class and become aware of the need for mobilization and debate of their civil, political and professional role. The Sindicato dos Radialistas (Radio Broadcasters Union), says Hagemann, is then created in 1963, during the mandate of Leonel Brizola, and the Primeiro Congresso Brasileiro dos Profissionais de Rádio-Difusão (First Brazilian Congress of Radio Broadcasting Professionals) is organized. This fact shows the articulations between political history and the history of radio in Brazil. It also shows that, this political articulation, which effectively avoids the 1961 coup and ensures the ascension of Vice-President João Goulart needed the support of a media, with specific characteristics such as the radio media: accessibility and mobility so a bunker could be assembled in the cellar of the Government’s building; mobility and speed to make it possible to form a table of transmissions which could broadcast in the country and abroad, all in record time aiming to mobilize the masses and generate social pressure. Let’s observe part of Brizola’s speech broadcast by the Rede da Legalidade in August 28, 1961 (translated from the Portuguese):

Since yesterday we have organized a service for receiving news from all over the country. It’s a network of ham radio broadcasting in an organized service. We started to receive, here, exchanged messages, even in code and by teletypes, between the III Army and the Ministry of War. I want to give you the more serious information revealed. Yesterday, for example – I will read quickly, because maybe it will cause the destruction of this radio station -, the Minister of War considered that the preservation of order “was only of interest of Governor Brizola”. So, is the Army an agent of disorder, soldiers of Brazil?! And another proof of madness! The text says: “fortitude and energy is needed from the III Army to stop the strength of the potential rival from growing”. “Am I the enemy, my counterparts?! I am being considered the enemy, my fellowmen, when all we want is order and peace. Like this one, many other radio stations are in contact even in the state of Paraná, and here we are

6 This governmental department was responsible for the maintenance and improvement of roads and general constructions for the public sector.
7 At the time, it was also responsible for matters related to the radio stations and radio broadcasting.
8 Holmes Aquino was a technician of Rádio Guaíba and his statement is available at the website of 50 years of Campaign for Legality (Campanha da Legalidade 50 anos)
9 His statement was presented in the Folha de São Paulo newspaper (section Caderno Ilustríssima) in August 7, 2011, in face of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Network of Legality.
10 At the time, the term “radiodifusão” (radio broadcasting) in Portuguese was written “radio-difusão”.

receiving messages on the phone coming from everywhere. More than one hundred people called and confirmed. Look at what General Orlando Geisel says, ordered by Marechal Odílio Denys, to the III Army: “The commander of the III Army must stop the course of action being developed by Governor Brizola”; “the III Army must act with maximum urgency and promptness”; “make all troops of Rio Grande do Sul, that you judge convenient, converge to Porto Alegre”; “The AirForce must perform bombings, if necessary”; “A task-force of the Navy is on its way to Rio Grande”, and “let us know what reinforcements you need”. General Geisel says more: “I insist that the seriousness of the national situation is a consequence of the situation in Rio Grande do Sul, since the orders sent in order to restrain the actions of Governor Brizola were not yet accomplished” “We will stay here until the end. You can shoot”

We highlight two aspects of this extract. First, the way the role of communication is highlighted. Brizola insists on that fact in other speeches and statements, making clear that the coup would not have been avoided if there wasn’t a medium of communication able to become national and international; communication, ensured and maintained by the radio broadcasters made it possible to inform, promote awareness of the citizen role to be fulfilled, the social mobilization which became the essential factor for the movement’s victory. All discourses point at this direction: without radio broadcasting, the masses wouldn’t have gone out on the streets; they wouldn’t have gathered at the main square; they wouldn’t have offered themselves in collaboration; national and international force wouldn’t have been created, a fact which pressured a great part of the political representatives to join the legality movement.

Here, we highlight the second aspect presented in the discourse and essential for the movement: the mobilization in favor of order and legality; every moment it is highlighted on the various speeches. The movement wants the compliance of the Constitution which ensures the right of ascension of the Vice-President when the President’s position is vacant. The far-right groups defend that the vice cannot become President. Again, General Lott, now retired, but still a legalist believer, mobilizes the legalist sectors in favor of the law enforcement. It is the “Campaign for Legality” moving the political scenario. Its role is fundamental, and we will retake it on the following quote:

The good news, however, came from Rio de Janeiro, where Marechal Henrique Teixeira Lott, retired but with great political prestige, distributes, on the night of 25th, a manifest to the Nation. The text says that, in spite of the efforts to restrain the War minister from stopping Goulart’s ascension, his plea, he stated, were useless. Lott declared:

“(…) I call all living forces of the country, the forces of production and thought, the students and the intellectuals, the workers and people in general, to take a decisive and energetic stand in respect to the Constitution, in order to fully preserve the Brazilian democracy, yet certain that my comrades from the Armed Forces will know how to behave in accordance to the standards of the legalist tradition which mark their history in the Nation’s destiny.”

Before being arrested, by orders of Denys, Lott told Brizola to look for some members of the military in Rio Grande do Sul, who would be in favor of a legal end to the crisis, such as Colonel Roberto Osório and Colonel Assis Brasil, the General Pery Belivácqua and the Commander of the First Cavalry, General Oromar Osório. Late afternoon on the same day, the first street protests emerged in Porto Alegre. (Ferreira, 1997, p. 6, translated from the Portuguese)

Such factor reinforces the perception that the military were not formed homogenously and, amongst them, a legalist group always existed, in favor of the formal compliance of the law, a group which, once again, was essential in the given political context. The way the “Network of Legality” worked reinforces, also, the role of cultural mediation established by the radio discourse. Once again, we can see the profound interaction between the discourse and the symbolic universe of the radio listener, but not only in terms of the workers value, but of their citizenship. The audience is called to perform a citizen role and they can identify with such role, because it ensures a social distinction as a citizen and creates a network of solidarity, another strong component of the reference of the popular culture. We can, then, check, that the “Campaign for Legality” can only be victorious through the integration of the different given factors, political, social and cultural factors, realized and stitched together by Brizola through the radio discourse. The power of Jango, however, is not totally ensured. It has to be
negotiated and in that moment it is restricted through the creation of a parliamentary logic, intended to ensure the legality but not the power of this president. Jango returns to Brazil and ascends as President in a parliamentary regime, with Tancredo Neves as Prime-Minister. Despite being in power, the coup is only postponed, and in 1964, the role of radio and all media is changed, especially from 1968 onwards with the censorship, which didn’t have a unique procedure. We have noticed, from a scientific research point of view, that a gap exists in this area since there is plenty of academic production on the censorship of the newspaper, but not on the censorship of radio, even because it’s impossible to censor the shortwaves. We must consider, also, when we think the radio object, on the impact of television media, mainly from the 1960’s. All of these elements show how rich and relevant the object here discussed is, the connections between the radio media and the political conditions in contemporary Brazil.

References


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